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THE CHANGING TRADITION OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW OF SIGN AND 
BILLBOARD REGULATION 
Ronald H. Rosenberg 
Professor of Law at the William and Mary Law School 
Williamsburg, Virginia 
The twentieth century has been an unparalleled 
period of growth and change in the United States. In 
1900, the total U.S. population stood at just over 
seventy-six million people while almost Qne hundred 
years later it has nearly reached two hundred and 
seventy-five million. Change has also occurred in the 
form of growth and development and during the last 
quarter century we have ceased to be a nation 
predominantly of city dwellers to become a country of 
suburbanites with more than more than fifty percent of 
the nation 's residents living in metropolitan suburbs. 
Although change has been the watchword over this 
century, certain local government concerns have 
remained constant. One such consistent issue has been 
the municipal desire to regulate the aesthetic quality of 
the community under the authority of the police power. 
As the discussion below will reveal, sign regulation has 
been a local government policy goal and one which has 
been legally controversial and frequently litigated 
throughout much of this period. Sign regulation, as one 
form of police power-based land use control, touches a 
number of constitutional values and throughout the 
century has encountered a changing series of 
constitutional law challenges reflective of the changing 
mix in emphasis of those values. The general thesis of 
this article is that over the century judicial review of sign 
regulation, as an aspect of aesthetic regulation, has 
become more hospitable and in recent years this form of 
land use control has generally emerged intact. 
Part 1. Early Twentieth Century Sign 
and Billboard Control: The Journey 
to Finding Aesthetic Regulation 
within the Police Power 
Municipalities have attempted to regulate signs 
throughout the twentieth century . . At the turn of the 
century, there was a surge in interest in classical urban 
architectural design and monumental city planning. This 
emphasis, which has been termed the City Beautiful 
Movement by urban historians, is believed to have 
developed as an outgrowth of the Chicago World's Fair 
of 1893. This movement affected more than just the 
design of large public buildings like the New York 
Public Library and the form of city planning like the 
McMillan Plan for Washington, D.C. As a complex 
cultural movement, it emphasized a range of values 
related to municipal improvement and the achievement 
of quality of life and aesthetic goals for urban places. 
One aspect of this desire to beautify cities was the 
control and occasionally the elimination of signs. The 
burgeoning commercial life of the turn of the century 
developed a world where signs began to be viewed as a 
form of visual pollution justifying municipal regulation 
based upon the state's police power. 
Municipal attempts to control the location and 
composition of signs coincides ~ith the urbanization of 
the United States which was accelerating at the last turn 
of the century. Although a strong public desire to 
improve the visuaJ characteristics of the urban 
environment existed at this time, state courts were 
surprisingly reluctant to approve early twentieth centUry 
local government sign regulations. Even though the 
authority to exercise regulatory power was usually not in 
doubt, American courts appeared concerned that an 
ordinary use of land for a previously lawful business 
would be eradicated in order to satisfy the subjective 
tastes of public authorities. The use of police power 
regulatory devices for the avoidance of such aesthetic or 
visual harms was difficult for most courts to support in 
the frrst decade of the century. This restrictive view of 
municipaJ sign regulation coincides with increased 
substantive due process analysis which resulted in the 
invalidation of many state laws as reflected by the 
famous Lochner decision. The following quote from a 
prominent New Jersey case captures the sentiment of the 
times. 
We think the control attempted to be 
exercised is in excess of that essential 
to effect the security of the public. It is 
probable that the enactment of ... the 
ordinance was due rather to aesthetic 
considerations than to considerations 
of the public safety. No case has been 
cited, nor are we aware of any case 
which holds that a man may be 
deprived of his property because his 
tastes are not those of his neighbors. 
Aesthetic considerations are a matter 
of lUXUry and indulgence rather than of 
necessity, and it is necessity alone 
which justifies the exercise of the 
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police power to take property without 
compensation. 
City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Advertising & 
Sign Painting Co .. 72 N.J.L. 285, 62 A. 267-8 (Err. & 
App. 1905). Although some of the earliest sign 
regulation decisions were grounded in other 
non-aesthetic police power justifications, state courts 
generally ruled against such regulations as 
"unauthorized" under the police power. This criticism 
recognized the unfamiliarity of aesthetic control as well 
as the perceived danger of encouraging personally 
subjective forms of municipal regulation. The 
overarching themes during this period were that signs 
constituted an acceptable and natural land use and that 
the approval of aesthetically-based regulation would lead 
to a tyrannical majoritarianism disconnected from 
.~ditional police power concerns. As a result, numerous 
cases struck down municipal billboard bans, I sign size 
and setback limitations/ and parkway location 
prohibitions. J 
These early holdings, while usually striking 
down the sign restrictions based upon illegitimate 
aesthetic purposes, would occasionally acknowledge 
other valid police power purposes for sign controls. 
These justifications, which gradually appeared in later 
cases, emphasized issues of public safety by being blown 
down, falling, burning, or coming into contact with 
electric wires,4 and the preservation of property values 
as an additional acceptable rationale.5 Some opinions 
during this early period would find extremely inventive, 
non-aesthetic rationales for limiting signs. For instance, 
in St. Louis Gunning Advertisement Co. v. City of St. 
Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (1911), the Missouri 
court found that signs were "constant menaces to the 
public safety and welfare of the city" in that they 
"endanger the public health, promote inunorality, 
constitute hiding places and retreats for criminals and all 
classes of miscreants." Whether or not using these 
extended rationales, reviewing courts slowly began to 
rule more favorably on sign and billboard regulation as 
they came to accept the protection of community 
aesthetic quality as a valid police power purpose. 
Adverse court decisions did not deter local 
governments nor abate popular support for sign controls. 
In the 1920's, local governments in most urban areas 
came under public pressure to limit billboards and other 
signs. The rapid urban and suburban expansion of this 
period drove municipal action to plan and regulate the 
form of the physical environment. During this period, 
courts demonstrated increasing receptivity to the 
municipal use of the police power to control community 
development. Prominent in this development was the 
judicial approval of the local government use of 
planning and zoning techniques found to be 
constitutional in 1926 in Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 
U.S. 365 (1926). With the approval ofland use control 
in Euclid, courts increasingly began to rule more 
approvingly on municipal efforts to regulate signs and 
billboards. They did so by altering their analysis by 
accepting aesthetics as one of the appropriate 
governmental goals for regulation under the police 
power. At base, this had previously represented a serious 
substantive due process problem for this form of land 
use regulation. Courts needed to determine that the 
exercise of governmental power for the protection of 
aesthetic values could be considered to be a valid 
regulatory object so as to satisfy the demands of due 
Varney & Green v. Williams, 155 Cal. 318,100 P. 867 (1909) and Posting Sign Co. v. Atlantic City, 71 NJ.L. 
72, 58 A. 342 (Sup. Ci. 1904). 
2 Curran Bill Posting & Distributing Co. v. City of Denver, 47 Colo. 221, 107 P. 26t" (1910); City of Chicago v. 
Gunning System, 114 III. App. 377, afrd 214111628,73 N.E. 1035 (1905); Crawford v. Topeka, 51 Kan. 756,33 P. 
476 (1893); City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting. Advertising & Sign Painting Co., 72 N.J.L. 285, 62 A. 267 (E 
& A 1905) (Sup Ct. 1904); Federal Advertising Com. v. Recorder of Borough of Fair Lawn, 8 NJ.Misc. 619, 151 A. 
285 (Sup. Ct. 1930); State v. Whitlock, 149 N.C. 542, 63 S.E. 123 (1908). 
3 Haller Sign Works v. Physical Culture Training School. 249 Ill. 436, 94 N.E. 920 (1911); Commonwealth v . 
• Boston Advertising Co., 188 Mass. 348, 74 N.E. 601 (1905). 
4 Cream City Bill Posting Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 158 Wis. 86, 147 N.W. 25 (1914) (upholding Milwaukee 
sign ordinance on safety grounds); Horton v. Old Colony Bill Posting Co., 36 R.I. 507, 90 A. 822 (I 914) (upholding 
Providence sign ordinance upheld for safety reasons); and State v. Staples, 157 N.C. 637, 73 S.E. 112 (1911) 
(upholding Ashville ordinance requiring billboards to be at least two feet off the ground to prevent collection of 
leaves and other debris creating the risk of fire and unsanitary conditions). 
5 Metromedia. Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981); John Donnelly & Sons. Inc. v. Outdoor 
Advertising Bd., 369 Mass. 206, 339 N.E.2d 709 (1975); Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of 
Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 492. 162 N.W.2d 206 (1968). 
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process review. Rather than accepting aesthetic purposes 
as a freestanding police power purpose, states courts 
beginning in the 1930's and 1940's -took an intennediate 
approach which held that aesthetic goals could be an 
appropriate governmental purpose as long as it was 
found to be supplementary to the achievement of other, 
traditional police power goals. Consequently, court 
opinions during this time usually discussed a long list of 
conventional police power factors connected to safety, 
morality, health and general welfare of the community to 
create a composite justification for the regulation.6 
As late as 1969, the Virginia Supreme Court 
had expressed this same sentiment in Kenyon Peck v. 
Kennedy, 2] 0 Va. 60, 168 S.E.2d 117 (1969), where it 
upheld a section of Arlington County's zoning ordinance 
which prohibited outdoor moving signs. Concurring in 
the view that aesthetic values could not, standing alone, 
support the exercise of the police power, this court said 
that, 
although aesthetic considerations 
alone may not justify police 
regulations, the fact that they enter 
into the reasons for the passage of an 
act or ordinance will not invalidate it if 
other elements within the scope of the 
police power are present. 
Is!.. at 63, 168 S.E.2d 120. Consequently, as long as 
there was another valid police power purpose for the 
prohibition - such as traffic safety as in Kenyon Peck -
the existence of an additional aesthetic justification did 
not invalidate the restriction. Reviewing courts in 
Virginia have not always been so accepting of local 
government explanations of regulatory purpose and have 
even second-gueSSed legislative motives. In the 1975 
case of Board of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 
146, 216 S.E.2d 199, 213 (1976), the Kenyon Peck 
rationale was used to strike down a county's architectural 
design review requirement because its "predominant 
purpose ... [was] to promote aesthetic values and the 
purpose recited in the ordinance to prote<:t property 
values was merely an incidental goal." It is ironic that in 
its most recent decisions, the Fourth Circuit has held that 
aesthetic justifications, by themselves, are sufficient 
governmental interests to support a municipal sign 
ordinance from First Amendment attack.7 
The upgrading of aesthetic objectives as a 
legitimate basis for municipal sign regulation over the 
course of this century has finally reached the point where 
it can be said that the clear majority rule holds that 
aesthetics alone constitutes a legitimate governmental 
purpose without the necessity of establishing more 
traditional police power support.8 Echoed in a series of 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions including Bennan v. 
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Village of Belle Terre v. 
Boraas, 416 U.S. I (1974); and Penn Central v. City of 
New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), the idea that "it is 
within the power of the legislature to detennine that the 
community should be beautiful as well as healthy, 
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as 
carefully patrolled" has tinnly established the principle 
that aesthetics constitutes an important local government 
purpose. In practice, modem cases usually find that sign 
regulations advance simultaneous public purposes 
including the prevention of visual clutter, traffic safety 
and the protection of tourism. The overall result has 
been the expanded use of municipal sign and billboard 
restriction pursuant to general or specific enabling 
authority granted in state enabling legislation. 
Part 2. Recognizing First Amendment 
Values in Sign Regulation 
If signs were considered to be merely structural 
aspects of a community, like houses, roads, schools, 
stores, they would easily be regulated with genera] land 
use control authority. However, signs are structures 
imbued with a special characteristic: their function is 
principally that of communication of a particular 
message. The exact message will vary depending upon 
the wishes of the sign owner and can range from site 
infonnation, commercial product and price data, 
inspirational religious and political messages, to just 
about any meaning that the owner wishes to 
communicate to the public. While outdoor signs are not 
the only method of communication, they represent an 
important avenue of idea transmission to a potentially 
large public audience. Due to this connection of the sign 
being a structure as well as a communicative device, it is 
not hard to predict that constitutional First Amendment 
values eventually would come into conflict with a 
locality's polir.e power authority to regulate or ban a sign 
in the name .:>f community land use control. It is the 
6 Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526. 529-30 (I YI7) (upholding Chicago billboard zoning 
ordinance without specific mention of aesthetic concerns); Mumhy. Inc. v. Town of West POrt, 131 Conn. 292, 40 
A.2d 177 (1944) (harming public health by ads for liquor and tobacco) and Little Pep Demonic Restaurant. Inc. v. 
Charlotte, 252 N.C. 324, 113 S.E.2d 422 (1960). 
7 
8 
See Georgia Outdoor Advertising. Inc. v. Waynesville, 833 F.2d 43. 46 (4th Cir. 1987). 
D. Mandelker, Land Use Law § 11 .05 (4th ed. 1997). 
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balance of these two competing forces which sets the 
framework for the current discussion of the law of sign 
and billboard control. 
The United States Supreme Court has only 
recently become interested in applying First Amendment 
doctrine to the subject of sign regulation. Although it 
previously had struck down municipal prohibition of 
residential "for saJe" signs in Linmark Associates. Inc. v. 
Township of Willingboro. 431 U.S. 85 (1977), its main 
discussion of commercial and non-commercial sign 
regulation has more recently emerged. Three principal 
decisions - Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 
U.S. 490 (1981) ("Metromedia"), City Council v. 
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) 
("Vincent"), and City of Ladue v. Gilleo. 512 U.S. 43, 
114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994) ("City of Ladue") - set out the 
central corpus of constitutional First Amendment theory 
for evaluating municipal efforts to regulate signs. Each 
of these decisions deserves separate attention. 
A. Metromedia 
In Metromedia, San Diego had passed an 
ordinance which generally banned "outdoor advertising 
display signs" while exempting two categories of signs 
from the ban's coverage. The first exempted category 
included onsite signs that identified the premises or the 
products manufactured, produced, or sold there. The 
second category exempted twelve carefully defmed 
categories including governmental and temporary 
political signs. Discerning the meaning of the 
Metromedia decision is not easy since the Supreme 
Court split into three blocks that drafted a total of five 
opinions: a plurality opinion of four Justices, a 
concurrence of two other Justices and three separate 
dissents. The following discussion will attempt to distill 
the concrete points of majority agreement. 
I. Upholding the Prohibition of Off site 
Commercial Outdoor Signs and 
Billboards 
The four Justice plurality and the three 
dissenters all agreed that the San Diego ordinance was 
constitutional as it applied to the general commercial 
otfsite billboard ban. The analytical framework for 
reaching this conclusion was the four part test for 
evaluating commercial speech restrictions adopted in 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corn. v. Public Service 
Commission. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). The Central Hudson 
standard contains the following elements: 
a) The First Amendment protects commercial speech 
only if that speech concerns lawful activity and is not 
misleading. A restriction on otherwise protected 
commercial speech is valid only if it. 
b) seeks to implement a substantiaJ governmental 
interest, 
c) directly advances that interest, and 
d) reaches no further than necessary to accomplish the 
given objective. 
Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507. The analysis resulted in a 
conclusion upholding the constitutionality of the San 
Diego general off'site commercial sign ban. The speech 
was protected under the first prong of the test since it 
was not deceptive nor unlawful. The second element 
was met because the restrictions implemented the city's 
"substantial" interest in safety and aesthetics. The four 
Justice plurality agreed that the ordinance did directly 
advance safety and aesthetic values, acknowledging "the 
accumulated, commonsense judgments of local 
lawmakers" without demonstrated scientific justification. 
Id. at 509. This was true even if local decisionmakers 
chose to restrict commercial billboards offsite and not 
onsite. 
The general conclusion from Metromedia is 
that all commercial billboards can be constitutionally 
banned either totally or partially. Importantly, the city 
was not required to present scientific or other highly 
detailed proof that the billboard ban advanced safety and 
aesthetic quality with the Court willingly to rely on 
common sense and the experience oflocallegislators.9 
2. The Ordinance Exemptions Deemed 
Unconstitutional 
The San Diego ordinance contained two 
exemptions from the general prohibition. The first 
category excluded onsite signs identifying the premises 
and the products sold at the location. This was viewed 
by the Court as limiting the content of onsite signs to 
commercial messages and banning non-commercial 
ones. The four Justice plurality interpreted this feature as 
a preference for commercial speech over 
non-commercial speech and consequently 
unconstitutional. Id. at 513. 
The second category of exemptions defined 
twelve types of signs permissible in spite of the general 
ban on offsite signs. Seven of the twelve exempted types 
were defmed by their content - including a variety of 
9 Later case decisions reaffirm this position. See e.g., Ackerley Communications of the Northwest. Inc. v. 
Krochaiis, 108 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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governmental signs and temporary political signs - and 
the plurality opinion ruled that this part of the ordinance 
violated essential first amendment principles that non-
commercial speech is entitled to the highest level of 
protection and that government may not pick and choose 
between forms of acceptable non-commercial speech. 
B. Vincent 
In the Vincent decision, 466 U.S. 789 (1984), a 
Los Angeles ordinance prohibited the posting of any 
type of sign on public property. The Court,. in a 6 to 3 
ruling, upheld the ordinance in a challenge by a 
candidate for local political office who had campaign 
signs, placed on the crossbars of electric power poles, 
removed by the city. Vincent asserted that the law was 
an unconstitutional interference with his First 
Amendment right to free political speech. The Court 
concluded that the ordinance was a "viewpoint neutral" 
time, place and manner regulation following the analysis 
in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
In conclusion, the Vincent opinion has held that 
an ordinance prohibiting signs form public property is 
constitutionally permissible if 1) the property is not a 
public forum, 2) the ban is a viewpoint neutral, 3) the 
prohibition satisfies the United States v. O'Brien tests, 
and 4) it leaves open adequate alternative channels of 
communication. 
C. City of Ladue 
City of Ladue, 114 S. Ct. 2043 (1994), 
presented an exclusive St. Louis suburb prohibiting 
homeowners from displaying all signs yet providing ten 
classes of exceptions including those for residence 
identification, safety hazard, and "for sale" signs. In 
addition, the ordinance allowed churches, schools, and 
some nonprofit organizations to display signs forbidden 
at residences. Commercial signs were also exempted in 
commercial or industrial zones. The city's main focus 
was the elimination of residential signs. This case was 
brought by a city resident prohibited from displaying a 
small 8 112 by 11 inch window sign reading "For Peace 
in the Gulf." A unanimous Court determined that the 
municipal law violated the First Amendment. 
The city defended its ordinance largely on an 
aesthetic basis seeking to prevent signs from creating 
"visual clutter" in its affluent residential neighborhoods. 
The Court accepted the city's claim that the regulation 
was neutral as to sign content or viewpoint. 'o However, 
its major analytical focus was upon 1) the significance of 
the government's interests and 2) the existence of 
alternative channels of communication for traditionally 
protected political speech. On the first of these two 
elements - aesthetics - the Court seemed less convinced 
of the city's interest even though this value had been 
recognized as being significant in the Metromedia and 
Vincent cases. Casting doubt on the city's suggested 
justifications for the prohibitory ordinance including ten 
categories of exemption, Justice Stevens concluded that 
the exemptions "may diminish the credibility of the 
government's [aesthetic] rationale for restricting speech 
in the ftrst place." Id. at 2044. This statement raises 
some doubt about municipal efforts to design a 
non-uniform, prohibitory sign ordinance and at least 
would seem to require a convincing, rational justification 
for the exemption. 
The second element of the City of Ladue 
holding - the availability of alternative channels of 
communication - focuses the emphasis on the traditional 
or non-commercial nature of the speech involved. 
Following this holding, an ordinance forbidding political 
message signs at residences would seem to be 
unconstitutional under nearly any interpretation of the 
case. The sweeping ban on the most protected form of 
speech, eliminating a "cheap and convenient" form of 
communication, at such a location most closely 
associated with individual liberty and expression would 
appear to have no equivalent alternative channel of 
communication. Interestingly, this total ban on 
residential private property was struck down while 
Metromedia's ban on commercial billboards and 
Vincent's prohibition of signs on public property were 
both constitutionally permissible. 
Ultimately, the facts in the City of Ladue case 
can be understood as presenting an example of 
municipal regulatory extremism with little convincing 
justification. In its conclusion the Court notes that "we 
are confident that more temperate measures could in 
large part satisi)' Ladue's stated regulatory needs without 
harm to the F :st Amendment rights of its citizens." Id. 
at 2047. Just exactly what "temperate measure" it had in 
10 Although Justice O'Connor, concurring, did not accept this assumption and would have preferred to test the 
city's ordinance as a content-based restriction. She said, "with rare exceptions, content discrimination in regulations 
of the speech of private citizens on private property or in a traditional public forum is presumptively impermissible, 
and this presumption is a very strong one." 114 S. Ct. at 2047. Certainly, though, she would have reached the same 
conclusion as Justice Stevens. 
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Second, a locality's governmental interests 
supporting sign and billboard regulation - usually traffic 
safety and aesthetics - have been completely accepted by 
the Fourth Circuit to the point that a challenge is 
"foreclosed." Georgia Outdoor Advertising, 833 F.2d at 
46. Basing its holding on this point on language in the 
Metromedia decision, the Fourth Circuit does not appear 
interested in examining the validity of governmental 
purposes underlying sign regulations and will not 
consider an argument that such an ordinance is "merely" 
an aesthetic regulation and therefore not rationally 
related to legitimate police power purposes. Attempts to 
derail such an ordinance by highlighting the weakness of 
the traffic safety justification would seem doomed to 
failure. 
Third, the only potential serious First 
Amendment concern derived from the Metromedia case 
was the allegedly preferential treatment accorded to 
commercial over non-commercial speech by virtue of 
definitions or exceptions benefiting commercial signs. 
See 453 US. at 509-10. This had been a major issue in 
San Diego's ordinance in Metromedia and it is often 
present in sign regulations barring off-premises signs yet 
allowing a broad range of on-site commercial 
advertising. The Fourth Circuit found in all three of 
these decisions that an ordinance could be "saved" from 
this attack by a feature which allows a non-commercial 
sign in any situation where a commercial sign would be 
lawfulY This technique has been copied in other Fourth 
Circuit jurisdictions and has received approval in recent 
cases. I. The only U.S. District Court decision in Virginia 
considering such an issue - Jackson v. City of 
Charlottesville - ruled that a city law permitting on-site 
commercial signs but prohibiting virtually all 
non-commercial communication and all off-site 
advertising of any nature violated the First Amendment. 
659 F. Supp. 470, 473 (1987). 
In Adams Outdoor Advertising v. City of 
Newport News, 236 Va. 370,387-88,373 S.E.2d 917, 
926-27 (1988), the Virginia Supreme Court also struck 
down the city's sign ordinance rejecting the argument 
that the regulation was a valid time, place and manner 
regulation and fmding that it impermissibly favored 
commercial over non-commercial speech. U The court 
based its decision on both the Virginia and the United 
States Constitutions although only citing federal case 
decisions. Viewing this discrepancy as a content-based 
distinction according higher value to commercial speech, 
the Virginia court noted that the ordinance did not 
contain a general exemption for all noncommercial 
communication. Although never referring to the 
contemporaneous Fourth Circuit decisions, this allusion 
suggested that non-commercial speech be provided with 
at least equal public access with commercial speech in 
order to be constitutional. 
C. Focused Prohibition of Signs and 
Billboards on an Industry Specific 
Basis 
During the last few years local governments 
have attempted to restrict the advertising of certain 
products thought to be harmful to minors. In particular, 
localities have designed billboard and sign ordinances to 
prohibit the advertisement of cigarettes and alcoholic 
beverages in certain publicly visible areas. These 
industry-specific sign restrictions were adopted in 
Baltimore, Maryland in early 1994 and have since 
undergone judicial review to determine their 
compatibility with constitutional commercial speech 
norms. In both instances, these "focused" sign 
prohibition ordinances have been upheld by the Fourth 
Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals. 
In Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc. v. City 
of Baltimore, 63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995), and 
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 63 F.3d 1305 (4th 
Cir. 1995), the appeals court viewed the city's effort to 
limit the advertisement of products as implementing an 
important and well-considered social policy of not 
encouraging minors to drink alcohol or smoke cigarettes. 
Both cases, facial challenges to each respective 
ordinance, followed the rule announced in the U.S. 
Supreme Court's holding in Central Hudson Gas and 
Electric Corp. v. Public Servo Commission, 447 U.S. 
557 (1980), which placed the burden upon the local 
government to justify its legislative action in enacting 
each law regulating commercial speech. However, even 
13 The Waynesville ordinance in Georgia Outdoor Advertising contained language that "any sign authorized in this 
ordinance is allowed to contain non-commercial copy in lieu of other copy." 833 F.2d at 46. While the Raleigh 
ordinance in Major Media stated that "nothing in this ordinance ... shall apply to non-commercial signs." 792 F.2d at 
1271. 
14 Revere National Com. V. Prince George's County, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 17337. 
15 The court struck down the entire ordinance, ignoring the severability argument, based upon its appraisal that the 
restrictions on commercial and non-commercial speech were "inextricably intertwined." 
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though it was undertaking "intermediate scrutiny" of the 
commercial speech regulation, the court did not defme 
the locality's burden too high nor make the court's review 
too intrusive. Judge Niemeyer wrote in Schmoke that, 
the court's inquiry is limited to 
consideration of the ordinance on its 
face against the background of the 
government's objective and the 
prospect of the ordinance's general 
effect. If it appears to the court that the 
legislative body could reasonably have 
believed, based on data, studies, 
history, or common sense, that the 
legislation would directly advance a 
substantial governmental interest, the 
government's burden of justifying it is 
met. 
63 F.3d at 1311. Then, the court applied the now 
common Central Hudson four-part test to detennine the 
constitutionality of the Baltimore regulations. Under 
Central Hudson, in order for commercial speech to be 
entitled to any First Amendment protection, the speech 
must (1) concern lawful activity and not be misleading. 
If it meets those threshold elements, local government 
may still regulate it if (2) the government is able to assert 
a substantial interest in support of the regulation; (3) it 
demonstrates that the regulation directly advances the 
governmental interest; and (4) the regulation is not more 
extensive , than necessary to serve the government's 
interest. 447 U.S. at 563-66. 
In its analysis the Fourth Circuit had no 
difficulty in finding that prongs one and two had been 
met finding that protecting minors from the hann of 
cigarettes and alcohol were obviously substantial 
governmental purposes. However, the main dispute 
focused upon the third and fourth factors in the Central 
Hudson test. Prong three required that the sign 
regulation "directly advance" the governmental interests. 
It is notable that the test set out only requires a "logical 
nexus" between the government's ends and the means it 
has selected. This relationship need not be as strict a 
nexus as that required for tort causation and it does not 
have to demonstrate that the regulation is the perfect 
policy choice. The locality must only show that "it was 
reasonable for the legislative body to conclude that its 
goal would be advanced in some material respect by the 
regulation." 63 F.3d at 1313. Ultimately, a reviewing 
court will evaluate the "reasonableness" of the local 
government's belief that the means chosen will advance 
its ends. In Schmoke the court placed emphasis on the 
city council's findings and the explicit reference to 
research studies to reinforce the reasonableness of its 
action. 
A more serious issue lay in the fourth prong of 
the Central Hudson test - that is, whether the commercial 
speech regulation "is not more extensive than is 
necessary" to serve the identified governmental interest. 
This requirement is sometimes referred to as the "narrow 
tailoring" element. Although the city's declared purpose 
was to insulate minors from the reach of cigarette and 
alcoholic beverage advertisements, its sign restrictions 
clearly also prevented adults from receiving the 
commercial messages. While this concerned the court, it 
ruled that local governments must be given "some 
reasonable latitude" in dealing with serious social 
problems. 63 F.3d 1316. Consequently, the ordinances, 
especially considering their exemptions for commercial 
and industrial zones, although not perfect were 
sufficiently well tailored to satisfy Central Hudson's 
fourth prong. It is not clear how much deference courts 
will give to the achievement of less compelling public 
purposes with weaker background support for the 
technique chosen. 
D. Sign Regulation Affecting 
Non-Commercial Speech 
While this area is one of free speech, rarely 
does a case present a non-commercial or traditional free 
speech interest challenging a municipal sign control 
ordinance. However, in Arlington County Republican 
Committee v. Arlington County, 983 F.2d 587 (4th Cir. 
1993), such a case arose. The plaintiffs sued to enjoin 
the county's sign ordinance in four ways: (1) limiting the 
number of temporary signs that could be posted in 
residential districts to two; (2) allowing seven work days 
for the processing of sign pennit applications; (3) 
prohibited portable signs except for bumper stickers and 
owner identifications; and (4) limiting the content of 
signs at commercial sites to the advertising of products 
or services available on the premises. In the U.S. District 
Court, plaintiffs won a preliminary injunction against 
enforcement of all four of these ordinance provisions 
based upon the conclusion that the requirements either 
were not narrowly tailored, did not serve stated interests, 
or favored commercial over non-commercial speech. 
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the court's 
focus concentrated solely on the issue of the county's 
limiting the number of temporary signs. The other issues 
had been rendered moot by the county's action in 
amending its sign ordinances to allow expressly 
non-commercial speech whenever the sign regulation 
would pennit commercial speech and by requiring a 
temporary sign permit decision within twenty-four hours. 
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The court carefully analyzed both the Supreme Court's 
and its own precedent before concluding there was no 
controlling Fourth Circuit opinion. Distinguishing this 
case on the basis that prior cases had dealt with 
commercial signs or billboards and that this litigation 
involved regulation infringing upon highly protected, 
political speech, it then analyzed the regulation using 
"more exacting scrutiny." 983 F.2d at 592. 
Using factors derived from United States v. 
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the court concluded that 
the two-sign limit 1) burdened speech, 2} was content 
neutral and 3) furthered substantial governmental 
interests in aesthetics and safety. However, the 
remaining two elements of the O'Brien test were found 
lacking. First, the court determined that the two-sign rule 
was not narrowly tailored to accomplish the identified 
governmental goals. Placing the burden upon the county, 
the Fourth Circuit was not convinced that the limitation 
was needed to achieve the aesthetic and safety objectives 
and furthermore, that there were other, less restrictive 
means to achieve the same results. Secondly, the court 
ruled that the two-sign limit did not provide sufficient 
alternatives for political speech rejecting those suggested 
by the county as being too time consuming or too 
expensive. The court believed that the two-sign limit left 
"no viable alternative means of political speech." 983 
F.2d at 594. In conclusion, the decision in Arlington 
County Republican Committee resonates with the same 
ideas that the U.S. Supreme Court would express in City 
of Ladue a year later. Eliminating or severely restricting 
a form of traditional personal expression in residential 
settings appears to require extensive and highly 
convincing municipal justification. 
E. Constitutionally Valid Sign and 
Billboard Regulation as an 
Unconstitutional Taking of 
Property 
With the successful defense of most municipal 
sign and billboard ordinances from First Amendment 
attack, local governments must be aware of another 
constitutionally-based challenge which has emerged to 
threaten local government ordinances. Commercial sign 
companies have raised the argument that an otherwise 
valid sign regulation may still violate the Takings Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment, that is, the sign controls 
prohibiting sign use and new construction, they argue, 
constitute a taking of commercial property without just 
compensation. With the upsurge in interest in private 
property rights as manifested in the U.S. Supreme 
Court's recent decisions in Nollan v. California 
Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (]992); and 
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), it is 
hardly surprising that such an argument would be raised 
by a previously lawful business that has its operations 
ended or substantially curtailed as a result of such an 
ordinance. 
Not surprisingly the Fourth Circuit has ruled 
that the taking claim "obviously presents a federal 
question,,16 and that the federal courts cannot divert such 
a claim to the state courts. However, while the taking 
argument has been regularly raised in federal litigation 
since the mid-1980's, it has not found any notable 
success for the plaintiffs. In Major Media the sign 
company challenged the city's 5 ]/2 year grace or 
amortization period as being so unreasonable so as to 
constitute a "taking" of property. 792 F.2d at ]273. 
While the Fourth Circuit ruled that the plaintiff had not 
presented sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of 
fact, the court did focus upon the "reasonableness" of the 
amortization period. The trial court had identified the 
factors of ]) the length of time of the amortization 
period and 2) whether the public gain achieved 
outweighs the private loss suffered by sign owners as 
being determinative, yet the appeals court did not 
analyze this issue. 
The third case in the Fourth Circuit's trilogy-
Naegele Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Durham, 
844 F.2d 172 (4th Cir. 1988) - presented a municipal 
billboard ordinance which prohibited all commercial, 
offsite advertising except those along interstate or 
primary highways. This ordinance had the effect of 
banning, after a 5 1/2 year amortization period, 85 
billboards out of a total of 13 7 that the company 
operated in the Durham area. Acknowledging that the 
takings inquiry is a fact sensitive one, the court found 
that the granting of the city's summary judgment motion 
without a fully developed factual record to be grounds 
for a remand. The court then looked to three U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions to provide the doctrinal basis 
for evaluating the taking claims. Analyzing this 
constitutional law framework yields legal conclusions 
favorable to the regulation of commercial signs. 
First, the appellate court set the general takings 
analysis from the two-part test announced in the 
Supreme Court's decision in Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 
225,260 (1980). Under this ruling, a land use regulation 
affects an unconstitutional taking of property ifit I} does 
not substantially advance legitimate state interests or 2} 
denies the owner the economically viable use of the 
16 ~ Georgia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Waynesville, 833 F.2d 43,47 (4th Cir. 1987). 
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land. Having concluded that the ordinance did advance a 
legitimate state interest in the protection of aesthetics, 
the court concentrated on the second factor in the Agins 
test. At this point, the analysis turned to the question of 
identifying the appropriate unit of property upon which 
to evaluate the economic effect. This inquiry serves as a 
crucial point in the takings analysis since if the owner's 
property interest is defmed expansively then the 
regulatory impact will have lesser economic effect than 
if the property interest is narrowly construed. 
Importantly, the Fourth Circuit looked to two Supreme 
Court cases - Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. 
DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), and Penn Central -
which applied a wholistic analysis to the takings 
question and in neither case found an unconstitutional 
regulation. Approving of this view the court quoted from 
Justice Brennan's opinion in Penn Central which noted 
that, 
'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide 
a single parcel into discrete segments 
and attempt to determine whether 
rights in a particular segment have 
been entirely abrogated. In deciding 
whether a particular governmental 
action has effected a taking, this Court 
focuses rather both on the character of 
the action and on the nature of the 
interference with rights in the parcel as 
a whole--here the city tax block 
designated as the 'landmark site.' 
107 S. Ct. at 1248. 
Adopting this approach, the district court, on 
remand, determined that the appropriate unit of property 
for purposes of the takings analysis was the sign 
company's business in the Durham metropolitan sign 
market. 803 F.Supp. 1068, 1074 (M.D.N.C. 1992). 
Once the property interest had been identified, the court 
detennined whether the sign ordinance deprived the 
company of the economically viable use of its property 
by applying a three step balancing test taken from the 
Penn Central case. 438 U.S. at 124. The Penn Central 
factors include: I) the economic impact of the regulation 
on the claimant, 2) the extent to which the regulation has 
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations, 
and 3) the character of the governmental action. 
Applying these factors, the trial court concluded that the 
Durham ordinance did not violate the Fifth Amendment. 
The crucial point in this analysis was the conclusion that 
the relevant unit of property for takings clause analysis 
was the broad array of signs owned by the plaintiff. 
Since a portion of the sign business, so defined, had 
been left intact, the Penn Central test had been satisfied. 
It is unclear what the result would have been had the unit 
of property been described as one or a finite number of 
signs and all had been prohibited by ordinance. The 
answer to that question awaits further litigation. 
The lessons derived from this brief review of 
the developing jurisprudence of sign regulation are 
several. First, it is clear that local governments and their 
constituencies have consistently supported the use of 
regulatory power to control both the form and location 
of signs and billboards throughout the century. Second, 
each attempt to accomplish this aesthetic purpose has 
been met by litigation resistance from the advertising 
industry and civil libertarians wishing to advance their 
own interests. Third, the tactics and arguments made by 
these opponents have varied over this period but have 
often raised issues framed in constitutional law terms. 
These constitutional arguments have changed with the 
changing emphasis of constitutional values in the nation. 
Sign regulation cases have come to reflect the ebb and 
flow of the prevailing constitutional theory. The local 
government attorney must be aware of this complex and 
changing tradition in ordinance drafting and defense, 
never forgetting that sign and billboard regulation is an 
area of land use control enveloped with special 
constitutional concerns and sensitivity. 
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